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COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF ITAH 
TOYOTA OF OGDEN, a Utah 
Coi-porat ion 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
JOtJN R. BULLOCK 
Defend,int .1 ml Appellant 
REPLY OF APPELLANT TO 
APPELLEE'S RESPONSE TO BRIEF 
I11 i nr 1 ty No . : i o 
Ca.se No. 920767-CA 
920900693-TJDC 
Appea 
THIRD JUDK I \J. iISTRlCT COURT 
SALT LAKt COUNTY 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Demnis V. Has lam (#1408) 
William W. Downs, Jr. (#0907) 
John W. Holt (#5720) 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Po®t Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
John R. Bullock 
„U7J i est 4700 South #59 
Reams, Utah 84118 
Telephone: (801) 966-3252 
Counsel lor Appellee Pro u<> for Appellant 
COMES NOW John R. Bullock, defendant/appellant alone named, 
in reply to the Response of Toyota of Ogden, plaintiff/appel1ee, 
to the Brief filed in this appeal. 
As to the pertinent parts in particular: 
JURISDICTION 
TOYOTA challenges the Court's jurisdiction in the appeal at 
Bar. BULLOCK advocates that the hearing, review, and judgement of 
this Court - for reasons of judicial efficiency and economy - are 
presently appropr iate. 
The doctrine of res judicata has two related but distinct 
branches. Both branches, however, have the dual purpose of 
protecting litigants from relitigating an identical issue and 
of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation. 
(See DeBry v. Fidelity 828 P.2d 520, Kemp v. Murray 680 P.2d 758, 
and Saunders v. Sharp 818 P.2d 574.) The concern for flexibility, 
judicial economy, and the preservation of substantial rights by 
preventing redundant litigation seem apparent in this appeal. 
TOYOTA's position that this Court lacks jurisdicition is 
premised on the contention that BULLOCK's change to the Docketing 
Statement was beyond timeliness constraints. The determination by 
this Court that it has jurisdiction would in no way abridge any of 
the substantial rights of the appellee, whereas a dismissal would 
involve significant redundancy to bring this matter to this point 
again. 
In the event the Court determines to dismiss this appeal, the 
Court's appropriate comments on BULLOCK's contentions as basis for 
this appeal would serve judicial efficiency in that such contentions 
will arise again at the trial court level. 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OR NEW TRIAL 
TOYOTA maintains that BULLOCK's claim of ineffective counsel 
should be denied because 1) it cannot be raised for the first time 
on appeal, and 2) this was a contempt hearing in a civil case and a 
constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not 
apply. 
In State v. Humphries, 818 2.Pd 1027, this Court determined that 
judicial economy may be served in peculiar, narrow circumstances 
including ineffectiveness of counsel as a new issue on appeal. The 
original meritless basis used by BULLOCK's counsel for the filing of 
the appeal at Bar and the subsequent withdrawl of BULLOCK's counsel 
six months after filing this appeal for reasons of disbarment, in 
conjunction with a lack of diligence supported by the record and 
fully noted in BULLOCK's Brief seem to meet such peculiar, narrow 
ci rcumstances. 
As noted in BULLOCK's Brief, the Order to Show Cause and the 
contempt proceeding - though ancillary to a civil case - was a criminal 
contempt proceeding and in State v. Lush, 95 N.W.2d 695 at [4] "... 
we have often said that a prosecution for criminal contempt is governed 
by, and to be conducted in accordance with, the strict rules applicable 
in criminal prosecutions." Presumably such should include the 
constitutional guarantee of effective counsel. 
TOYOTA further maintains, beyond these two bases for dismissal, 
that BULLOCK has failed to meet the burden of showing that counsel 
was ineffective and that had his counsel done the things BULLOCK 
claims should have been done, the result would have been different. 
TOYOTA presents in its response to the Brief in the statement 
of facts the full transcription of the ten messages left on the 
answering machine of Mr, Tony Divino between 5:10 p.m. and 10:37 p.m. 
on Saturday, June 27, 1992. BULLOCK's drunken spree in essence 
amounts to his talking to himself for a total period of less than five 
minutes. Though BULLOCK is contrite with regard to the language used 
in these messages, BULLOCK does proffer that had his evidence of 
mitigating circumstances been allowed by the trial judge this language 
would appear mild and tame as compared to that used to provoke BULLOCK. 
TOYOTA also maintains at point 13. pg 10 of its Response that 
the trial court heard testimony and concluded that TOYOTA's "goading" 
or provocation would not have occurred had BULLOCK not made the 
initial call to TOYOTA's place of business. Because the trial court 
sustained TOYOTAfs objection to the presentation of testimony and 
evidence regarding mitigating circumstances, such was never fully 
presented to the court. The judge's opinion that the provocation 
would not have occurred without BULLOCK's first calling TOYOTA's 
place of business lacked adequate basis in its finding of fact. 
Though BULLOCK has maintained, as noted by TOYOTA, that his counsel 
was persistent at the trial on this single issue, it should be noted 
that BULLOCK's counsel, through an apparent lack of diligence, did 
not follow up and use this as basis in the original filing of this 
appeal. 
With regard to the trial court's jurisdicition TOYOTA maintains 
on page 20 of its Response that, "Even if counsel had objected [to the 
presentation of an amended constable's return], it is apparent the 
result would have been the same." Such objection may have resulted 
in an evidentiary hearing that would have allowed counsel a reasonable 
time for preparation of BULLOCK's case, such extension having been 
denied by the trial court judge. With proper preparation, the outcome 
of this case may have determined that the ten calls placed to the 
answering machine of Tony Divino were a single violation of the 
trial court's order enjoining Bullock from responding to TOYOTA's 
provocations. The outcome may have been significantly different. 
As to the reasonableness of attorney's fees awarded, TOYOTA has 
chosen not to address the prima facie case of the trial judge lacking 
adequate fact or the argument of excessive burden in hours presented 
in BULLOCK's brief on pages 20, 21 and 22 except to essentially say 
because counsel presented them the fees were reasonable. 
The 'clearly erroneous" standard of Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 
1162, appears to be present in this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
As to TOYOTA's request to be awarded costs and attorney's fees 
in defending this appeal, BULLOCK respectfully submits that this 
appeal has merit and is not frivolous. As such TOYOTA has no claim 
by contract or in law for the awarding of attorney's fees. 
BULLOCK humbly requests this Court to allow the hearing of this 
appeal and grant the relief requested by appellant. 
V\ 2 1 n^ day of February, 1994. 
John R. Bullock, Pro se 
Defendant/Appellant 
5075 West 4700 South #59 
Kearns, Utah 84118 
